(1964) Philosophy is ye knowledge of ye powers & Connections of Nature with reasonings deduc'd from them, it is of two kinds viz, Natural which explains ye different properties & opperation of body or matter; & Moral, which shews us our duty, or ye art of being virtuous & happy.

ye latter is what we shall treat of, it is call'd an Art, & a Science, because it deduces these Rules from Man's nature & condition, & proves it absolutely necessary to be real happiness

ye Object of this Art, is Man's duty in his several moral Obligations & capacities; its Office is to shew from whence these duties arise, & where they end; its intent is to make us happy, & it employs rules by which we may obtain it.

As all Arts deserve more or less esteem as they are more or less calculated for our happiness, so this Moral art or Science, ye means by which our duty or happiness is clearly plac'd in our view, & without which we should be worse than ye Brute creation ought to be ye Touch stone by which we are to try all other arts.

Having settl'd ye subject & end of this glorious Science, let us next see how it is to be prosecuted.

Moral as well as Natural philosophy appeals to nature, observation, reason, & undoubted experiments for ye truth of what it alledges, therefore we must observe ye conduct of nature in different cases, collect ye various Phenomenas, & reduce these to general principles, which may be apply'd to ye explaining

'Tis impossible he can have liv'd so long without being sens of the order, Wisdom, & Goodness which appears in the visible Creation; & of those strong suggestions of Parent mind, the Source of all intelligence & beauty.

His Manhood

Man having now attain'd to his prime, either new passions arise, or the old ones are much encreas'd; for seeing his connections with his own Countrymen & particularly with his wife & children, & taking a larger view of Human life, its wants & enjoyments, he forms stronger friendships, lays down a plan of interest, & becomes more attentive to the concerns of society. he enters into family connections, & partake of the joys & pains of the state. the providing for his old age is the dominant passion of this period.

When he is arrived to old age, his heat being cool'd, he is fit to direct youth. Anxiety, love of ease, Fearfulness, & Foresight are peculiar passions of the age. by his coolness he by experience he recollects his past follies, & by looking forward & prepares for the worst. Thus every age has its particular passions, which correspond with its period.

When he begins to go out & increase his acquaintance

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of other appearances of Nature.

Moral Philosophy therefore only examines how man is constituted, from what principles his actions flow, & what he is form'd to by Nature. This obliges us to take him to pieces, ye. we may see ye. mutual relations of one part to another, & ye. common tendency of ye. whole.

Of Man & his Connections.

We must remember in giving a short sketch of man, ye. he arrives by slow degrees to ye. age of maturity, his intellectuals growing stronger as he passes thro' ye. different stages of life; till he draws near ye. grave; we will therefore examine ye. principles yt. direct his actions thro' this progression.

Ye. Man's Infant state.

Ye. Infant is a poor helpless creature, having neither food nor raiment, full of wants, yet unable to supply them; but ye. ties of Nature implant such strong affection in ye. breast of ye. parents, yt. they neither grudge labour, nor shun danger to preserve their Offspring. Hunger & Thirst are soon express'd by significant motions; all ye. other senses, appear soon struck with their proper objects; bright appearances, strong sounds, raise commotions, form ye. love of novelty, & keep wonder awake; ye. child by degrees acquainted with his Parents, family, & familiar objects, grows fond of them, uneasy when absent, happy when recover'd. These feelings are ye. foundation of attachements to his Parents & family; hence he enters into their joy & grief; hope & fear; & according as he is well or ill affected to them, he gets ye. denomination of a good or a bad Creature;

This is a short Sketch of ye principal powers of ye mind, ~~[illegible]~~ ye mind, ~~[illegible]~~ ye impel us to action, but do not guide it. ~~ye Reflection is [illegible] to guide their actions, [illegible] [illegible]~~. We are conscious of a principle within us call'd Reason or Reflexion, ye notiveally superintends & directs ye actions of ye mind, which examines, compares & weighs things, & forsees ye consequences of Affections & actions. By this power we look back on ye past times, forward into futurity, & in short see ye whole order & oeconomy of life. it is not intended to suggest new sensations ~~[illegible] oeconomy of life, [illegible]~~ but to range & examine ye old ones. ~~[illegible] but [illegible]~~

We have another principle within us call'd Conscience or ye moral sense which approves of some sentiments, passions & actions; & disapproves of their reverse; according to ye determination of this inward judge, we name some actions & principles of conduct, right, good, honest, & other wrong, bad, dishonest; ye former whether they regard our interest or not, excite our esteem, & affection, & ye latter of course we despise, & dislike.

Reason & Conscience are evidently different in their nature & kind from ye Passions & Affections; ye Passions being only blind impulses, acting without regard either to ye interest of individuals or of ye whole system; but ye directing & judging powers settle & distinguish ye various forces, mutual proportions & relations which ye passions bear to each other & to ye whole; & can restrain ye passions to a proper consistency one with another, & a regular subordination to ye whole system.

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* There are also secondary or occasional passions, some of which exist when our original affections are gratified, & others when they are disappointed, as hope, complacence, & Calousy, confidence &c.

By this plain, but strong springs, whether periodical or fixed, man tho' a weak Creature is preserved & drove to supply his own wants, & to guard against ye various dangers yt surround him. He is also by these joined with his fellow creatures, enters into a family life, & at last all are link'd into one system, or body, where each sympathises for his associates.

In examining ye train of passions which fill up ye various stages of human life, we perceive ~~this distinction betwe~~ them, yt some are for ye Good of ye individual, & others for yt of ye species; which has occasion'd ye former being call'd private, & ye latter publick affections; Love of life, pleasure, & power, is of ye first sort; & of ye last are Compassion, Gratitude, Friendship, & natural affection &c. Some of ye private passions only regard ye Security & defence of ye Creature, as resentment, fear, but others aim at some positive good, as, ye desire of Health, Ease, Fame, for a distinction we will call'd ye former sort defensive passions because they answer to our dangers, & prompt us to avoid them if we can, & if not, to meet them boldly.

Ye other kinds of private passions which pursue a positive Good, may be rem'd appetites but we will stick to ye name private in opposition to ye defensive passions. Man having various wants to supply, & being capable of many Enjoyments according to ye different parts of life, ought to have a certain train of private affections, to engage him to get what is necessary for his Welfare.

Our publick affections, are ~~fitted~~ suited to ye several social connections & relations we bear to others, by making us see their dangers, prompt us to assist them, & by interesting us in their wants, & making us supply them.

~~[illegible]~~ ye Wants of one may be ~~[illegible]~~ supply'd by ye capacities of another, & ye weaknesses of one, by ye passions of another.

There are other passions yt are not peculiar to any Period of life ~~[illegible]~~, but stronger or of less force, in proportion to ye feelings of everyone; ~~[illegible]~~ Self Love, benevolence, Love of Life, honour, shame, hope, fear, desire, Aversion, Joy, sorrow, anger &c. are of this kind; ye two 1st are of a more temperate kind, one for ye good of ye individual, ye other ~~[illegible]~~ of ye [illegible] ies. To sorrow, hope & fear seem to be only different degrees ~~[illegible]~~ of ye Original [illegible] Love & Hatred, desire & aversion, arising from [illegible] desir'd or abhorr'd are present or absent. ~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible] depend upon [illegible] there, & [illegible] depend [illegible] existence [illegible] some [illegible] have [illegible] together [illegible] individual [illegible] his [illegible]~~

Man's constitution being so well fitted to his state, by ye gradual Evolution of his powers, order is preserv'd, society upheld, & human Life fill'd with such variety of passion & action, ~~[illegible]~~ which alone enliven & diversify it.

His Childhood.

31 In ye next Stage of his life, which the properly call'd ye age when Appetites have ye ascendant; yet ye child's imagination & intellectual powers daily improve by seeing a greater variety of objects, he forms agreeable & disagreable ideas, & represents some objects as alluring, & others as odious to him.

His Active & Social Powers enlarge in proportion to his Views; ye love of Action, imitation, & praise, Emulation & daily appears & increase & fondness of change. His passions are quick, variable & pliant, & very impression; his attachments & disgusts soon succeed each other. He compares things, judges of Characters, & loves or hates them, as either they appear in an agreable, or disagreable manner to him or those he loves. He grows conscious of his own actions; triumphs when applauded, & ashamd when despised; ye Moral tie grows stronger, he finds he is accountable to others as well as himself for his conduct, & thus is daily improving for Society & action.

As Man advances from Childhood to Youth, his passions & perceptions are more extended, new pleasure, drawn him after new objects; he finds ye attraction of beauty a tenderer attachement than he ever before felt, & by it forms makes his other passions milder. & this fire, ye pleasure of friendship, Company, Exercise & diversions, he finds a greater ye love of truth, of imitation & of design, encreases upon him; ye more his connections & spread, his Neighbours & Country men, ye more intense his thirst of praise, Emulation & social affections grow.

Of Duty or Moral Obligation

It is by ye design of any Power yt we must direct its motions, & vallue ye degree of force necessary to its Just Ends; if it has not force enough we call it defective, & if overchargd; in either of which cases it is imperfect. If it was as it ought to be, we should esteem it right; ~~we will~~ ~~apply~~ this reasoning to ye passions.

As ye defence & security of ye individual is ye aim of ye defensive passions, yt defence & security must be ye measure of their strength; ~~shall~~ if they are too weak, or ~~[illegible]~~ if they exceed what they ought, they ~~are~~ doubt ~~unjustifie~~ answer ye End proposed. Neither fear nor resentment are desirable, yet if we have ~~[illegible]~~ a certain degree of them we shall be ~~[illegible]~~ excusd; & if we ~~have~~ [illegible] of them, we shall be miserable; thus ~~[illegible]~~ Cowardice which is ye excess of fear, instead of saving us, only renders us incapable of ~~[illegible]~~ defending ourselves, when in danger; & fool-hardiness, or ye having too little fear ~~[illegible]~~, makes us insensible of danger, even when in ye height of it. Revenge, or excessive Resentment, by its violence deprives us of presence of mind, which is ye best aid we can have when ~~[illegible]~~ injurd, & makes us pursue ye Aggressor, farther than self-preservation demands, on ye Contrary Pusillanimity, or ye too great want of resentment sinks ye mind into a passive enervating tameness, which puts us off our guard ~~[illegible]~~ ~~therefore~~, we ought to keep ye defensive passions duly proportiond to our dangers.

Yt private passions lead us to follow some positive kind of private Good; yt good must consequently be ye measure of their respective forces, & direct their operation; if they should be too weak

or sluggish in ye pursuit of their Ends, they are evidently deficient, or they defeat them by their impetuosity, they have overshot ye intentions of Nature. Thus Vanity, or ye too greedy desire of praise, drawsman into many measures to gain popularity, which on ye contrary make him forfeit ye Honour he so vehemently runs after. On ye other hand a total indifference of ye Esteem of Mankind, disposes a strong Guard to give the Mind & leaves ye Mind open to ye greatest persecutions. Therefore our private passions & desires proportion'd to our wants, is ye just Measure & pitch of this class of Affections.

ye defensive & private passions agree in general in their tendency to ye good of ye individual, therefore whenever there is a collision of interest, ye Aggregate of Good, or Happiness, which is compos'd of ye particular Goods to which they respectively tend, must be ye common Standard by which their Comparative degrees of strength must be measur'd; if any of these in ye degree they prevail, are inconsistent with ye greatest aggregate of Good, then they are disproportionate. For when we judge of a particular System of powers, we denominate y^t ye supreme, or principal ball, where ye aims of ye several parts coincide, & the esteem them in due proportion, then they preserve ye proper subservient consequently to proportion our defensive & private passions in such measure to our dangers & wants, as to secure ye Individual & obtain ye greatest aggregate of private Good, or Happiness, in their just balance, in case of Competition

× By giving particular instances, wh have traced ye true pitch of ye different classes of ~~passions~~ affections, when reported. Now ye Virtue or perfection of any Creature being his following what he was design'd for, man's virtue consists in his acting agreably to ye natural tenour of his affections.

But as none of ye passions are independent, we cannot say when they are too strong, or too weak, if they are considerd singly; therefore their end must be first understood, & their relation to ye whole system of affections; thus ye love of life is too strong, if it diminishes ye regard we owe our Country; & love of fame wants force, if it does not encourage man to be more active in ye pursuit of Virtue, & more publick spirited.

also as ye publick passions tend towards ye good of others, yt good must be ye standard by which their force is to be examined & if any passion of this rank defeats ye interest of what it is meant to promote, by its violence, or disproportion, 'tis excessive or irregular. Thus natural affection if degenerate into a passionate fondness, not only hinders ye Parents from judging what is ye true interest of their Child, but often draws them into partial indulgences.

Every sort of Affection points at ye good of ye particular object. There may be a collision of interests, & ye ties of ye least consequence to society must yield to ye which is ye greatest. Therefore we look on this kind of Affections as sound, when they are properly proportion'd to ye dangerous wants of others, & to ye various relations in which we stand to individuals, & to society.

constitution or just œconomy

We therefore conclude from this induction yt ye just œconomy of Human Nature, consists in a ~~proper~~ regular subordination of ye Passions to ye Authority of Conscience & ye direction of Reason.

Yt subordination is regular, when ye defensive passions are proportion'd to our dangers; when ye private passions, are proportion'd to our wants, & when ye publick affections adapted to our publick connections, & proportion'd to ye wants & dangers of others. This last Branch is differently express'd than ye two first, yt it may include our most important duty, viz. yt to ye Author of our Nature, who is supremely happy & perfect, & consequently can have no wants to supply, & cannot be hurt by any change.

We call ye natural State, or ye sound & vigourous constitution of any creature, or ye just œconomy of its Powers, its Health & perfection; & ye acting agreeably to these, it Virtue or Goodness. therefore Man's health & perfection ~~consists~~ lies ~~[illegible]~~ in ye subordination of his passions to ye Authority & direction of Conscience & Reason, & his virtue consists in his acting agreeably to yt order & œconomy

~~It is evident yt ye conduct of ye powers & passions will be greatest [illegible] to reason, first by examining ye consequences of things, or ye relation & aptitudes of means to ends, reason plainly shews, & experience confirms it, 1st by having our defensive passions are equal to our dangers we shall [illegible] 2d when ye private passions are proportion'd to our wants, we shall be best able to supply them, & 3d by adapting our publick affections to our social Relations, ye good of others, we shall~~

hich they are naturally form'd

If 'tis ask'd how far ye Affections towards private good or happiness ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ may be indulg'd, ye answer is, when by it none of ye higher obligations ~~[illegible]~~ are violated.

~~[illegible]~~

Whether there is ever a collision of interests between ye publick & private Affections shall be consider'd ~~afterwards~~ in another place; but if there is no collision, there is little if any danger yt they will be carried too far, particularly ye publick, if both kinds are subservient to a well regulate self love, & to a calm benevolence, which principles stand as Guards at ye Head of Each System.

We now understand ye force of ye passions when they are seperately consider'd, & their ballance, when their relation is examin'd.

Whatever ye Principle is yt maintains this ballance, & yt is form'd within us to direct ye passions, so as to keep them from interfering with each other, must undoubtedly be of a superior Nature to them, & ought to order their measures, & govern their proportions. Now it has been already laid down, yt Reason or Reflexions is this Principle; & yt there is another controuling principle call'd Conscience, or ye Moral Sense, which judges ye Affections & actions, pronouncing some just & good, & other unjust & bad; ~~therefore~~ it follows yt ye passions acting thro' blind impulse are inferior to this judging faculty. Therefore if we would follow ye order of Nature, ye passions ought to be subject to ye authority of ye leading Principles.

+ + It is evident yt such a conduct of yd powers & passions will be agreable to ye dictates of reason; for if we examine ye consequences of things, or ye relations & aptitudes of means to ends, reason plainly shews, & experience confirms it, yt to have our defensive passions equal to our dangers, is yd most ready way of avoiding them, & of obtaining ye wish'd for security; yt to proportion our private passions to our wants is ye best means to supply them; & yt to adapt our publick affections to our social relations, & ye good of others, is ye surest method of fulfilling yd one & procuring yd other. So yt in this sense virtue may very properly be term'd a conduct conformable to reason, as reason finds an aptitude in such an oeconomy to answer yd ends for w

 If ye idea of Moral obligation is only to be deduc'd from this aptitude or connection between certain passions, & certain ends obtain'd or to be obtain'd by them; then is reason (1.) ye proper judge (2.) of Moral obligation, (which sees this ~~aptitude~~), & it may be defin'd on this supposition, as some already have, ye connection between ye Action & ye motive; for ye End is ye motive, or final cause, & ye passion is ye Action, or immediate natural Cause. A man solely out of self love may be induc'd to fulfil ye obligation which arises from ye connection between ye defensive passions & Ends, or ye private passions & Ends; because in ye case his own interest will make him allow them ye proper proportion requir'd. But if he has no affections ye point beyond himself, no principle but self love, what can interest him in ye happiness of others, where he was no advantage by it; or what sense can he have of Moral obligation to promote it? Therefore without publick or social Affection there could be no motive, & consequently no moral obligation to a beneficent disinterested conduct.

If ye simple connection between certain passions, or order of passions, & certain Ends, are what gives us ye idea of moral obligation; why may not ye apposiness of any conduct, even any piece of Machinery to answer its end, for an equally strict Moral Obligation^n. for ye Aptitude & connection of ye last instances is as strong & invariable as in ye former. But we must trace ye idea of moral Obligation thro' a more natural source, because this is confounding ye most obvious differences of things.

+ Let us therefore appeal to our inmost sense & experience, how we feel with regard to those different sets of passions in ye. just measure & ballance of which, we found a right temper to consist: this is totally to be determin'd by our own experience in which (as in all other natural Enquiries) we must examine, what are ye. genuine feelings & operations of nature, & what affections or symptoms of them appear in ye. given instance.

++ these we reckon marks of an ingenuous mind, & look on those where they are wanting as remarkably dull, & in some degree immoral.

X ~~Let us therefore appeal to our inmost sense & opinion, & we shall with regard to those different sorts of passions in all instances we shall find that this is the only & right test & rule to direct us with. This is the only & right rule & safe guide in all other moral inquiries in which we must be guided by our own experience, & analyzing natural living~~

Tho' ye defensive passions of Anger & fear give us rather pain than pleasure, yet we cannot help feeling them when wrong'd, & in danger; we estimate him imperfect ye has nothing of them & should condemn ourselves if void of a proper degree of resentment & caution; but if our resentment is greater than ye wrong done us, or our caution exceeds ye risk we run, we blame ourselves for having overacted our part. Therefore it is proper to indulge them as far as they are suited to our welfare, & when ye security is once obtain'd, we look on any greater degree of it as unmanly & mean spirited, nor will such a conduct on cool reflection give any self approving joy.

As to ye private passions we should reckon any one defective & even blameable ye had no degree of self love, or affection for pleasure & ease, which are necessary to ye perfection & happiness of ye individual. Thus we condemn ye man ye destroys his fortune, & health, & exposes his life without a proper cause, we not only pity him but even despise him; yet those who have a discreet self regard do not gain our admiration, yet we approve as a well contriv'd Machine, & as necessary to compleat ye virtuous character, & as entirely suited to our present indigent state. There other passions regarding private good, which we approve in a much higher degree viz ye love of knowledge, of action, of Honour &c. xx

ye sociall affections, as compassion, natural affection, Friendship, benevolence &c. we admire & approve, in a much greater degree than any others of ye passions; we esteem them necessary ~~parts of ye~~ fitted to our structure & state, & those who are without them we call difficient. Of these as well as of all other Affections, friendship is ye most to be coveted, & may with justice be call'd ye sum of all happiness, nothing on this earth equalling ye pleasure of having a true & sincere friend. ~~But~~ We look on ye Publick affections as always amiable, & commend ourselves, & esteem all others ~~[illegible]~~ worthy of our regard & friendship, who indulge them.

We make a great difference between those social Affections which drive us on to pursue their particular good as Pity, natural Affection &c. & those calm affections & desires which more steadly promote ye happiness of others; ye former we call passions, to distinguish them from ye others, which are generally call'd Affections; ye first we approve, but more highly admire ye latter & feel a moral complacence towards it, & towards all limitations of ye particular instincts, by ye principle of universal benevolence. ye more objects ye calm affections have, ye more we vallue them; & we reckon any one immoral & unnatural who instead of feeling these affections, entertains Malice, Rancour, & ill will in his mind.

~~[illegible] We have now [illegible] how we feel [illegible] order of Affections &c. Therefore when we feel ourselves moved [illegible] these Affections & passions [illegible] [illegible] ye [illegible] think of them & others prompted [illegible] [illegible] of moral obligation.~~

a State of Moral obligation. Now if a Parent, Friend, or Benefactor should be reduc'd to want, & yt. we are in a Situation to give them instant assistance & relief; to what conduct are we oblig'd? What will nature in such an instance require of us? why she will command us to tell us, yt. immediate relief ought to be given. Again if any thing has been deposited into our hands, & some time after reclaim'd by yr. owner, we must undoubtedly feel ourselves force'd to restore it. If we acted differently in either of these cases, we should detest ourselves as having done wrong, & beneath yr. dignity of our nature. but if we have conducted ourselves rightly in these instances we are happy & pleas'd with ourselves.

To describe therefore what we cannot rightly define a State of Moral obligation is yt. State where a Creature yt. has such powers, affections, & senses as man, should he refuse to fulfil it, would condemn himself, & think others ought also to condemn him; but on complying with it, would approve, & expect others to approve his conduct.

We call him who is in such a State a Moral Agent, & as man's Structure & connections often subject him to Moral obligation, we conclude him a moral Agent; But as in frenzies or natural functions he acts without choise or affection, as in cases of compulsion or Necessity, therefore to name any action Moral, yt. is approvable or blameable, it must be done from affection & choise, then a morally good action is to fulfil a Moral Obligation by choise & willingly; & on immoral action, is yr. violating a moral obligation on purpose.

'Tis by a series of actions & not by one single one yt. a character is constituted, & by a series of Affections & not simply by one, yt. a temper is constituted

V. We have now examin'd how we feel when ye several ranks of ~~[illegible]~~ affections & passions pass before our mental eye; therefore when we are affected in ye manner before describ'd towards those affections & passions, when we meditate on them, & when we are instantaneously & independently prompted to a correspondent conduct, we call ye

therefore we also call ye a morally good character, where in a series of ~~good~~ morally good actions prevail; & ye a morally good temper, in which ye morally good affections have ye ascendant; & bad character & temper is determin'd by ye reverse. But where ye above mention'd order ~~or~~ proportion of passions is maintain'd, there a series of morally good affections & actions will prevail; so ye to have a morally good Temper & character is, ye maintaining ye order & proportion; but a morally good Temper & character is Moral Rectitude, Integrity Virtue, or ye completion of duty.

If 'tis ask'd how we come by ye idea of Moral obligation or duty? We may with reason answer ye we come by it, in like manner as ~~we~~ by our original & primary perceptions, we get them all from ye great founder of Nature; for this idea is no creature of ye mind, nor dependent on any previous act or volition, but arises ~~from~~ on certain occasions, or when other ideas appear before ye mind as necessarily, unavoidably & instantaneously, as pain on coming too near a fire, & pleasure from ye friction of any good. For instance 'tis not in our choice whether we will feel ye obligation to assist a distress'd parent, or to restore what is deposited into our hands. we cannot call this a compound idea made up of many Ideas; yet we must certainly have antecedent ideas to it, such as ye of a parent — in distress — of a child — able to assist — of ye Relation of one to another — of a Trust — of right &c. but none of these make ye perception of Obligation. This idea is quite different from & superadded to ye ideas of ye relation between them. These by a law of our nature are ye occasion of suggesting the

~~them. These by a law of our nature suggestit~~

it, but they are as different from it, as colours are from sounds. By reflection we find ye relations between things, & ye favours or deposits we have receiv'd, ye different circumstances of ye case are either matters of fact or of Experience, but some inward organ or power, or whatever you please to call it, perceives, by perfect of instantaneous sympathy, before ye cool deductions of reason, & independent of ~~prayer~~ previous instruction, art, or Volition, ye moral Harmony, ye irresistible charms of Moral obligation, which instantly interests ye correspondent passions, & forces us to fulfil its lawful dictates.

We need not fear any danger will accrue from ye sifness of its decisions, nor ~~apprehend~~ be in a perplexed because it looks like & has been call'd instinct. Should we not greatly disapprove of ye man ye would take time to deliberate whether he should assist a distress'd Parent, feed a starving Neighbour, or restore what he was entrusted with? Should we not look on him as a knave, & without feelings? but there are cases where if a depositt his sword with us & in a frenzy or Melancholy one's & demands it, out of reason & prudence we aught not at ye time to restore it, least he should destroy himself or others.

It has been objected to this Moral obligation ye it is an instinct, or necessary determination of our nature; but are not ye perception & determinations of reason equally necessary? Does not every intuitive judgement ~~[illegible]~~ of course exert our ~~[illegible]~~ apart when ye agreement or disagreement of ye ideas compar'd is perceiv'd. Instinct having been ~~con~~sider'd are relative only to bodily

sense & appetite, as a mere brutal sensation, in which ye mind takes no part; this term therefore has been look'd on as very obnoxious to great Exceptions in Morals; but is a moral determination ye worse for being mingl'd with ye frame & constitution of our nature; for being steddy in its decisions. Why should such a divine instinct be rank'd less suitable ye dignity of ye mind, than those self evident perceptions which are conversant in abstract truths, & necessarily & instantaneously arise from ye clear relations of things, as reason does often or, why should any other power of perception be despis'd because not infallible?

I think it evidently appears from what has been said, yt it is neither ye pleasure nor agreable sensations yt accompany ye Exercise of ye several Affections, nor those consequent to ye actions, yt constitute moral Obligation, or excite's ye idea of it in us. yt pleasure is after ye idea of obligation, & some times we are oblig'd to owne ourselves under an obligation, to such affections & actions, as are attended with pain; as in trials of virtue, we are forc'd to sacrifice private to publick Good, & present pleasure to future interest. We have pleasure in assisting an aged parent, but it is neither ye perception nor prospect of yt pleasure, yt gives us ye idea of obligation to yt conduct.

Therefore when say obligation, duty, ought, &c. they are meant as uncompounded feelings, & simple ideas of ye human mind,

It can no more be defin'd than other simple ideas

III. Various hypotheses concerning moral obligation.

We shall be able to judge better of ye various hypotheses yt have been made to deduce ye origin of Moral obligation, from ye induction yt has been made.

Hobbes, who look'd on Mankind with an unfavorable eye, has taken a partial view of our nature, & has drawn a very odious picture of us. He pretends yt next to ye desire of self preservation ye love of Glory & power is ye governing passion of Man; & from these he grounds an unnatural hypothesis, contrary to common experience he tries to deduce all ye other passions yt inflame ye mind, & influence ye conduct of men. He says yt all men are equally able to do mischief; yt all desire & have a right to ye same things, "& want to excel each other in power & honour; but as all cannot "obtain a preeminence in power & honour, this is ye cause why "mutual contests arise, ~~they~~ a natural ~~desire~~ passion to invade ye ~~rights~~ property "~~of others~~ & destroy ye Character & power of each other, & to raise & secure "themselves against ye attempts of others. In this state where "every individual has a right to every thing, & may justly hinder "his neighbour by force or fraud this naturally produces a state "of war & mutual carnage. In such a state nothing can be unjust "or unlawful; for all having a right to ye End, have also to ye means, "which are ~~found~~ by force; & this is what he calls a State of nature. "But he adds yt men seeing ~~ye inconveniences yt would arise~~ this state would bring on them ~~not~~ inevitably "destruction, resolv'd to give up their private unlimited right to ye Majority, or such as they should appoint, & to subject themselves for ye future to common laws, or to common Magistrates, by this agreement & surrender they are secur'd again

mutual hostilities, to force'd to act peaceably; so y^t. his now unlawful to attack any man's property; so y^t. according to this wild Philosopher this compact is y^e. origin of Justice, & y^e. foundation of duty & moral obligation.

But he may with great propriety be ask'd what obligations a man is under to keep his promise, if there is no moral tie distinct from y^t. promise, & independent & previous to it? If there is none, his promise will be vain & men are as great Barbarians as before y^e. union; but if there are obligations previous to fidelity Honour & regard to engagements, then right & wrong, justice & injustice are previous to ~~that~~ agreement. He may indeed tell us y^t. y^e. necessity of y^e. case or a ~~gr~~ regard to our own safety, which is include in y^e. publick, makes us keep our engagements. We may be ~~punish'd~~ for breach of faith, by those to whom we ~~to~~ ~~you~~ transfer our Rights. If we will speak out, y^t. ~~force~~ superior strength of y^e. Majority to punish y^e. ~~force~~ contumacious is undoubtedly y^e. true foundation of y^e. obligation, & self love is its only Judge & Measure. If this be so, ~~what obligation is man under~~ what obligation is man under to Gratitude, Friendship, & all other duties of Humanity, which fall not under y^e. cognizance of Law? & what are y^e. obligations to private Veracity, Honesty, & Fidelity, when a man with safety may be a knave? Therefore y^e. scheme y^t. sets us loose from such obligations, & involves us in such absurdities, must of itself be absurd & wicked. Y^e. State of Nature which is supposes as its foundation, is only a dead, which from y^e. nature of y^e. creature we have no reason think ever subsisted;

therefore ye conclusion ~~what he~~ drawn from it are also chimerical. Hobbes thought all Men either Knaves or Fools, & wanted to make a system of Government agreable to ye corrupt taste of ye reigning powers, & to ye genius of a ~~most~~ abandon'd Court, a Government plan'd to make a small part of Mankind tyrants & all ye rest Slaves. He only measur'd Virtue by ~~wills~~ Utility, & while pretending to be ye first yt found this connection, & yt gave true reasons for ye practice of honesty, either wilfully, or ~~designedly~~ inadvertently he has ~~mist~~ overlooked ~~inadvertently~~ its true nature, & inseperable connection with ye perfection & happiness of ye Individual.

Other moralists ~~Establish~~ Morals upon ye positive appointment of ye deity, & ~~define~~ define virtue to be ye conformity to yt appointment. They say yt all obligation supposes one who has a right to prescribe, & can reward ye obedient, & punish ye disobedient; this can only be Our Creator. His Will is therefore our law, which we are bound to obey, & they say this alone is able to ~~oblige~~ bind such corrupt creatures as we are, who are but slightly touch'd with a sense of ye beauty & excellency of Virtue, & are strongly sway'd by views of interest.

yt Virtue is agreable to ye Will of God is certain, yt conduct being pointed out to us by our minds, which is ye effect of ye will, or appointment of ye Deity; ∴ yt whatever is agreable to our mental faculties, must also be agreable to ye Will of God; & therefore all ye indications, ~~&~~ dictates of our Duty, which are enforc'd by our minds, may look'd on as indications or sanctions of ye will of ye Creator. If thro' inattention or Abuse of ye

structure, these indications should prove insufficient to declare, or if these sanctions thro' ye weakness or wickedness of men, should be of too little weight to enforce obedience to ye Divine Will, & ye Deity should please to add new indications or sanctions; these ~~fresh~~ indications or sanctions by ye Apostles or this Scheme are not supposed to add any new Moral Obligation, but only a clearer declaration of our duty, or a ~~stronger~~ sanction or motive from interest to perform yt duty, & to fulfil yt obligation, to which before we were bound. It makes no difference as to ye obligation whether ye will of ye creator is declared by word, scrit, or by ye inward determinations of our own minds, arising according to a necessary law of our nature.

— According to whichever of these we suppose ye divine will intimated to us, ye 1st question yt naturally occurs is, why we are oblig'd to obey ye Divine Will? if we are answer'd yt he is our superior & can reward & punish us; this is making obligation nothing but interest. If we say he is our Creator & Benefactor, & yt we ought to obey him, & be grateful to him, this infers ye obligation to an inward perception, yt obedience is due to one's Creator, & gratitude to one's Benefactor. How can we otherwise connect those Relations unless we recur to ye principle of self interest? If Duty & Moral obligation are ~~be too~~ weak when built on Moral perception to bind us, 'tis to be fear'd yt ye same objection will be made to ye sanctions & inclinations of ye Divine Will, they having as yet not produced a thorough & Universal Reformation.

Those ye. talk of ye. Will of God, as ye. Rule of duty, don't mean a blind principle of Action, but such a one as is govern'd by Wisdom & Reason, or a regard to certain Ends in preference to others. If we don't suppose ye. ye. Deity has some principle ye. corresponds with our sense of Obligation, or antecedent Determination of his Nature, to prefer some things to others, we shall not be able to give any reason why we should any Choise at all; so ye. whatever is ye. Ground of ye. Choise, or Will must be ye. Ground of ye. Obligation, & not ye. Choise, or Will itself. This plainly appears from ye. difference ye. Divines, & Philosophers make between Moral & Positive Commands & Duties, ye. former they think obligatory, antecedent to Will, or at least to any Declaration of it; ye. latter obligatory only, in consequence of a positive appointment of ye. Divine Will; but how can there be any foundation for this difference, if all duty & Obligation be equally ye. result of mere Will &c.

Other Philosophers have tried to lay ye. foundation of morals much deeper, & on a firmer bottom, viz. ye. nature & reasons, ye. truth & fitness of things. They say ye. Senses & affections are vague, & precarious, & tho' they are not, yet irrational Principles of Action, & therefore very improper foundations, on which to rest ye. eternal, & immutable obligations of Morality. They consequently talk much of ye. Abstract nature & Reasons of things, eternal differences &c

& from these suppose Moral obligation to arise. They call a conformity to truth, virtue; & ye opposite vice.

~~We perceive ye nature of things by different senses, & upon them, when they are perceiv'd, our reason then pronounces~~

By different senses we find ye nature of things, & then our reason acts upon them, & hence what is true, or false; what may be affirm'd, or deny'd concerning them. Thus by sense or experience we perceive ye character of a Benefactor, & of a Beneficiary, & when we have compar'd, we find another idea in our mind, which we call ye Relation between ye Benefactor & Beneficiary; & in ye foundation of yt relation, we perceive some benefit receiv'd. But are any of these ideas yt we mean by ye Moral Obligation, ye idea of gratitude due to a Benefactor from ye Beneficiary? This is evidently, a distinct perception plain to some sense, but not ye result of Reasoning. Tho Reason may suggest to a Beneficiary, yt it is in affluence, yt ye state of his Benefactor who is in prison for a small debt, would be much chang'd for ye better, if he would give a small share of his Wealth, yet will Reason, with a certain degree of Affection, prompt him to such a well plac'd Charity? Or will ye perception of his relation to his Benefactor, & of ye benefit receiv'd, make him approve such a conduct, unless we suppose a feeling quite different from yt perception of ye intervening relation, & of ye ground of yt Relation? We might therefore see all ye possible

Relations of things, & yet be quite indifferent to this or ye
conduct, unless we had some sense, or affection, which made us
approve, or disapprove, love, or dislike; ye other conducing
undoubted Reason may perceive an Aptitude to a certain
end, but with some Affection, we cannot have any idea
of an End, & without which we cannot conceive any inducement
to action. Consequently we must know what are ye natures meant,
& for what ends they are proposed, & what affections prompt them
to act, before we can understand ye Reasons, & fitnesses of things,
which are said to be ye foundation of Morals; otherwise
we are incapable of judging concerning ye duty requisd,
or of ye Conduct of him whom we suppose under Moral
obligation. But when once ye natures are given, & ye relations
ascertaind, we can determine what conduct will be obligatory
to such natures, & adapted to their condition & Oeconomy; ye
same conduct will be always, & unalterably proper, as long
as ye same Natures are placd in ye same Relations.

ye Calling Morality a conformity to the truth, gives
no idea, but what is equally applicable to Vice; whatever
characteristicks are predicable of virtue,
viz ye it is agreable to ye order of Nature, ye it tends to
happiness &c. ye opposites are so of Vice. What is truth but ye conformity
of propositions to ye nature & reality of things? He has not
vice its nature, & consequences as well as Virtue? And
is not a conduct suited to true propositions, a conduct conformable
to truth? Could an understand any sort of Artist, ye in taking

of some of his work, should say y^t it was made according to truth, & y^t their Art lay in adjusting them to truth? Should not understand them better, if they would mention ye End or use, & in order to y^t shew us their ~~[illegible]~~ parts together, & seperately? Is not y^t some detail necessary to understand Human Nature, & its Ends, & Duty? Will y^t truth, ye Abstract natures & reasons, y^t eternal reasons & fitnesses of things from such a detail? But if it could, what degrees of Virtue & Vice, does truth admit? Truth is a simple, invariable thing, incapable of intension or remission. But Virtue & Vice have mighty variations, & therefore cannot be foundedon a thing y^t admits of none; for ye Structure must be of y^t same kind as y^t foundation.

But it is said, y^t deducing Moral obligation from an inward sense, is making it very precarious, & changeable, for if man had been constituted to approve of treachery, malice, cruelty, a quite opposite train of duties, would have been requir'd, or obligatory.

'Tis true y^t Human nature might have been different, made than it is, but it may be doubted considering ye State of things, whether it could have been better under this Government, who does every thing by weight & measure, & who has pour'd Wisdom & beauty in all his Works; y^t short sketch y^t has been given of our nature, shews how well it is suited to our present condition, & our various connections. We could ~~[illegible]~~ not have lasted, or at least with

difficulty in our present situation, if deprived of ye different ranks of passions, which we are endued with. He who settl'd our condition & connections, must also have ordain'd ye conduct of Powers, & ballance of Passions, which is so entirely adjusted to ye condition & connections. Such an order of creatures being supposed, & such a condition & connections such a conduct as has been trac'd out, must always be obligatory, to a creature so plac'd & connected. If man had been a Spider or Hound, different duties would have been necessary; ye Web, ye Vigilance & rapacity of ye former; ye sagacity, love of game, & swiftness of ye latter, & ye pleasure of appetite, & propagation, & love of Offspring, common to both, would have been his proper business & oeconomy. But Man being a Creature not only sensible, active & social, but also rational, Political, & Religious, he has more numerous, & important Obligations to fulfil. & if afterwards he shall be set in a superior station, his Duties, & obligations will increase in ye same proportion. If therefore man had been form'd to approve of treachery &c. such a temper would evidently have prov'd destructive of his happiness. Now if ye Deity prefers our happiness to our misery, we will of course ye means most fitted ye end; ~~therefore~~ consequently ye Deity being Wise & Good, could not have implanted in us such dispositions as would necessarily overturn our happiness; therefore among ye various possible constitutions, vice could never be approveable, & obligatory.

This scheme of Human Nature, rests on ye same foundation as ye Divine Wisdom & Goodness, & ye scheme of Moral obligation built on it, must as immutable & immortal; & all ye Works of Nature prove their Creator to be supremely & universally wise & good.

'tis also said in objection to this Scheme, ye some men approve treachery &c. nay ye Whole nations encourage theft, & exposition of Infants, & many other as ~~dreadful~~ black Crimes, therefore ye Moral Sense which is recommended as ye Judge of Morals, is either not universal, or an uncertain Rule.

We can no more conclude ye ye internal perception, or moral Sense of Right & wrong is not an universal standard of judging in morals, because of ye diversity of practice concerning moral obligation, than ~~as~~ because of ye different opinions of ye merit of a painting, we should infer ye there is no after Rule of judging in ye Art. In ye last instance, men call upon nature, from particular ~~[illegible]~~ tastes & manners, as ye test of it, & owne ye just imitation of it, to be ye perfection of ye Science; but they differ in ye application of ye Rule to particular instances, from a diversity in Education, taste, & prejudice. ye same is true of Morals; for men agree to ye Rule in general, & call upon our common nature & Sense, & seldom are mistaken or disagree in impartial cases. Wherever they deviate from their standard, a satisfactory account may be given of their variations.

In those States which have allow'd theft & ye exposition of children, there was hardly any property, all things being in common, it was thought much better to train up a hardy Youth, than to secure any private property; ~~this exposition [illegible] the [illegible] private Effects to [illegible] ye Public~~ tho' it is not doubted but they lov'd their Children, yet as they were look on as useless, & detrimental to a ~~[illegible]~~

common wealth form'd on a warlike plan; they ~~were entirely the~~ esteem'd
this exposition ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ praiseworthy, ~~[illegible]~~ for ye Publick, to ye most endearing private
affections. They fell into this mistake by supposing a competition
between ye two interests, ~~but by~~ divesting themselves of parental
affection; they would have avoided this, if ~~they~~ their ~~[illegible]~~ policy had been more
refin'd & extensive. In some countries they put their ag'd parents
to death, ~~[illegible]~~ Q. is it for want of natural Affection? No, but they
think to release them from ye miseries of old Age. In short
neither selfish ingratitude, nor any other immoral ~~form~~, are
ever approv'd. men only are mistaken in ye tendency, Consequence
& other circumstances of ye Action. It may appear in different lights
according to ye various opinions, passions, & other circustances, of
ye moral Actor; but yet ye general rule is allow'd, ye Moral
reality admit'd, & ye deviation from it condemn'd. Thus all
condemn inhumanity, yet by ~~some~~ a certain Religion persecution is approv'd
in ye case, out of an opinion ye 'tis for ye Honour of God, to
which principle all humanity should yield; yet to a well informed
mind this doctrine, with whatever pious name it is sanctify'd,
must appear cruel & inhuman. Malice is dislik'd, yet to
hate a wicked man, or resent an injury is thought conducive to
private security or Publick good, & ye Actors think it a noble
indignation of vice, even when in their most outrageous sallies.
A Highwayman condemns injustice, & resents ye knavery of his
accomplice; but to excuse himself, ye necessity has no law, & ye
self preservation must be obey'd. From these & ye like instances,
it appears not difficult to account for ye different opinions
concerning Moral Obligation, ~~from~~ viz. ye nature of happiness, ye
partials connections Men have form'd, ye false opinions in Religion,
& ye violent passions which make them not attend to ye moral
reality as they ought. Therefore by separating what is foreign, &

difficulty in our present condition if we had not had different 29.
~~difficulty in our present condition, we have [illegible]~~
ranks of Robinson should have been miserable.
~~if we [illegible] should have been miserable [illegible] wil~~
we should have been miserable if without them, or a certain
number

appealing as above to ye true test of Nature, & by observing
the reasons of ye variations we find among individuals, we
see ye Stability of ye Rule of Moral Obligation, & ye
universality of ye Sense; ye variations only serve to prove
it more clearly.

From this We may conclude yt ye nature & reasons of things
would never have suggested ye ye simple idea of Moral
Obligation to us, if we had not a Sense ~~other~~ capable of admitting it.
It is so interwoven with our ~~frame~~ nature, yt we are by it a law
to ourselves. We are not forc'd to trace this law by ~~abst~~ deductions
of Reason, or by subtile enquiries, ye ye Abstract nature & &
relations of things; we need not to seek it in Heaven, nor
below; it is within us, ever active on ye mind, & engraven on
ye heart in ye large signatures of conscience, Natural Affection,
Compassion, Gratitude, & universal Benevolence.

IV. Final Causes of Our Moral Faculties of perception & Affection

Having taken a general view of Man, his moral powers & connections, & on these form'd a Moral Obligation, which seems to be confirm'd by experience, to be agreable to reason, & approved by his most inward, & sacred Senses. We will now examine more particularly ye final causes of those springs, which impel him to action, & of those clogs which restrain him from it. By this particular view, we shall be able to pronounce concerning their times to answer their End, in a creature of such capacity such Wants, in such dangers, & capable of such enjoyments; & shall be in a condition to judge of ye End of his whole structure, its harmony with his State, & consequently of its obedience in answering ye benevolent intentions of its Great Creator.

In taking this subject to pieces, it will not be necessary to examine every minute particle, but only ye great parts, & to trace their use in ye disposition of ye whole.

ye Great Creator has in all his Works mingl'd a variety of contrary principles; light & darkness, pleasure & pain, good & evil; There are higher & lower powers, & many between ye two extremes, these are differently plac'd, subject to each other, & all of them subordinate to ye perfection of ye whole. We may suppose man surrounded by ye innumerable orders of beings, by his outward frame drawing to ye material System, & by his inward connected with ye moral & rational affected by ye good & ill which spring from these

Laws. In this variety of relations with which he is encompass'd, & of contingencies, to which he is liable, he feels a strong attraction to ye Good, & repulsion from ye evil. But as good & evil are often blended together, & these effects being frequently ye consequence of hidden relations, & general Laws, ye force of which he is not a proper judge of, it is easy for him to mistake Good for evil, & evil for good, so yt he may often be attracted by what is destructive, & may repel what is salutary. He is of so tender a constitution, yt he is frequently troubl'd with sickness, Cold, Heat, Fatigue, & innumerable Wants, yet he has so little knowledge, & his reason is so weak, yt he frequently cannot judge in ye way of reasoning of ye connections of those effects with their respective causes, or of ye various latent energies of natural things. The Experience of certain Senses, or organs of perception, teach him this Connection, which by a mechanical & instantaneous motion, feel ye good & evil, receive pleasure from one, & pain from ye other, by these, without any Reasoning, he is taught to chuse what is for his advantage, & to avoid what tends to his ruine. Thus by taste & Smell, he finds what agrees with his constitution, & by pain, he knows what disagrees with it, but not by these conversant in ye inward constitution of things.

Some of ye Senses are subject to pains, yt he may be forc'd to follow ye Objects yt are suited to them; thus Hunger, Thirst, Cold &c by their painful importunities, compel him to get food, Drink, Cloaths, Shelter &c. Those instincts which prompt us with some degree of commotion to pursue good, & avoid evil, we call Appetites & passions. Our Senses therefore shew us what is good or evil to ye individual, & our Private appetites & passions, force us to ye one, & restrain us from ye other.

Because of this machinery, & ye train of wants we are subject to, we have such a series of occupations, ye require the application, or bodily labour, or both. ye necessaries of life, & some coveniences to make it more easy & agreable, must be provided; to obtain this, Arts, Industry, Trade, & Manufactures are necessary; & to enjoy their fruits, civil Government, Policy, & Laws must be made, & ye different Business of Publick life carried on. Thus while man is busied in obtain security for himself, he is by degrees engaged in connections with a family, friends, neighbours, & a commonwealth; Hence new passions, interests & cares arise, which occasion a vast distraction & embarrasment, & introduce a great train both of Publick & Private good & evil; & in all this confusion, plans of Action must be form'd & inconveniences guarded against, & frequently resolutions must be taken without reasoning or delay.

To provide against this, ye Great Author of Nature, has taught ye individual by particular sensations what is private good, & private evil, & has by keen instincts drove him to pursue ye former, & avoid ye latter. But what security has ye Omnipotent creator made for ye Community? Who shall answer for his good behaviour to it?

Our Supreme Parent has not left man to be shewn only by ye cool notices of reason, of good or evil, ye happiness or misery of his fellow creatures, he has made them sensible of their good & happiness, but particularly of their evil & misery, by sympathy or ye quick feeling of pleasure & pain.

ye latter we call compassion; for tho' all who are not quite divested of Humanity feel ye former in some degree, we have not

no name, unless we call it Congratulation, or ye good humour which arises from seeing others happy. Both these feelings have in general been call'd Common sense, by which we are interested in ye concerns of others as really, tho' less sensibly than in our own.

When we see any one suffer thro' ye injury of another, we feel resentment against ye unjust causer of ye misery; if we are conscious ye it is owing to our fault, we are ashamed. Both these classes of passions, concerning misery & wrong, are arm'd with such strong sensations of pain, ye are not only a defence to ye Publick System, but serve to lessen those evils it does suffer. Compassion makes us bear a part in ye misfortunes of others, & makes us in a great degree unhappy, till they are relieved. This particular adapted to human life (as Dr. Butler very properly observes) "it being oftener in our power to do mischief than good, & to prevent & lessen misery, than to communicate positive happiness, & therefore it is an admirable restraint upon ye more selfish passions, or those violent impulses ye carry us to ye hurt of others".

There are other passions ye interest us in ye affairs of others, while we are pursuing our own concerns; these are very productive of good, & greatly averse to everything ye tends to evil; of this kind are natural affection, Friendship, gratitude love of one's Country &c. Now it having been proved ye ye private passions are accompanied with strong sensations of desire & uneasiness, which makes men pursue what is for his advantage, & avoid ye Contrary; so in this class of Affections it quick sensation are as ne'essary, to engage us in a proper activity for our Relations, Country, & neighbours.

Our sense of right & wrong will shew y^t it is our duty, & reason, & experience y^t it is our interest to promote ye happiness of others; but these would sometimes prove insufficient in cases of danger, & in ye constant hurry y^t ye private passions involve us into, if we were not assisted by those kind affections, which mark out our particular duties, & with an agreable violence fix us down to them.

It is therefore evident y^t ye private & publick passions are intended to limit each others influence, & so keep ye exact ballance. In general pain which accompanies hunger & thirst, & ye other private appetites, or to great fatigue either of mind or body, prevent us from ye excess of thinking in ye search of truth & from violent application of any kind, on ye other hand perception, love of action, of truth, honour, publick virtue &c. are wisely placed in ye opposite scale, to prevent us from debasing ye dignity of man, below ye condition of Brutes. So y^t by this reaction of ye powers, ye bad effects are avoided y^t would arise if they acted singly, & ye good effects of each are produced.

ye same opposition appears in ye counteworkings of particular private & publick affections against each other; thus compassion is set bounds to resentment, & resentment of injuries done to ourselves or Friends who are dearer than ourselves, prevents a feminate compassion, & makes us despise labour or death. Natural Affection, friendship, love for one's country, or zeal for any particular virtue, often master ye selfish Passions. On ye other hand if we had no self love, ye instincts of ye human heart, would discend into most torturing anxiety, & downright Frenzy.

+ ye Omnipotent Author of nature, (knowing y^t amidst ye infinite attractions, repulsions, & dissipations of this life, man would not foresee ye consequences of things, & therefore would commit gross blunders, particularly if sober deductions of reason were necessary) has graciously given him particular perceptions or determinations, ~~to approve~~ of qualities which are for ye advantage of society & of ye individual, tho' he does not always see their tendency. These Perceptions or determinations do without reasoning shew us before our views of interest what conduct is beneficial to ye Publick, & useful to ye Private System; y^t sense of candour & veracity, hatred of fraud, ye sense of fidelity, Justice, Gratitude, disapprobation of Injustice, ingratitude cruelty &c. are of this kind ye former of those actions are approv'd, & ye latter disapprov'd by us

Not only ye different classes of Affections are checks upon one another, but also those of ye same sort interfere & wrestle with one another, thus ye too violent resentment is kept back by fear, & ye latter is often controul'd by ye former, when kindl'd by ye wrongs we have suffer'd.

a calm Self love is plac'd at ye head of ye Private passions, to direct their attractions & Repulsions. ye Publick Affections are controul'd by a dispassionate Benevolence, which in ye same manner ought limit their motion. So ye Passions on one side may be look'd on as powers urging mankind to a certain course, with a force proportion'd to ye greatness of ye good aim'd at. & on ye other as weights ballancing ye action of ye powers, & controuling ye violence of their impulses. By these powers & weights a ballance is fix'd in ye human breast by ye Great Creator, which makes ye Creature act pretty steady, in ye variety of Stages we meet with.

tho' without thinking of their inclination, or conduciveness to ye happiness or misery of ourselves or others. In ye one we see a beauty worthy ye dignity of man, & in ye other a deformity, & debasement of human Nature.

There are other principles ~~whether~~ inferior in degree, if not in kind to these, yt we approve of, & are connected either with ye good of Society or of ye Individual, ~~where~~ this it does not plainly appear; gravity, modesty, temperance, & prudent Oeconomy are of this kind, ~~their opposites~~ we dislike their opposites, & even when these are wanting. These sort of feelings are either different degrees of ye moral Sense, or subject to it, & have ye same good effect, in teaching us ~~how to~~ in ye thro' ye varieties of life, what is right, & wrong, what to be pursued & avoided. & prompts us to a suitable conduct.

~~It is evident that~~ he ~~immediate effect of~~ ~~ye tendency of this principle to ye advantage of~~ ye tendency of this principle to ye advantage of Society & ye individual, ~~this tendency~~ cannot always be ~~perceived~~ foreseen, & would often be mistaken by man who is often misled by his passions, & subject to want & Error. Principles therefore yt are so closely attach'd to private Security & Publick good, which direct him without reasoning are very fit for his present State, & well calculated for to obtain universal benevolence.

It would be easy by turning ye subject in another manner, to shew how man's moral powers & affections are suited to yt progressive & probationary stages he is to run thro'. Our faculties being small & imperfect, they must be improv'd by attention & exercise, this is not only true when we talk of our intellectuals, but also ~~them~~ of our Moral Powers. ye former often blunder in Speculation, & ye latter in practice, & both ~~of~~ frequently lead us into misfortune ~~we bring~~ on account of our passions. These misfortunes are very healthful trials, they making us examine the causes of them, which enlarge our views & refine our Passions, & therefore both improve our intellectual, & Moral Powers. This shews yt our passions are ye rude unfinish'd materials of our Virtue, which we are to polish, they give us ~~ye~~ action, & ~~task~~ assist us in ye vicissitudes of fortune ~~produce us in ye~~

& give Vis a struggles & triumphs; to guide them properly in every State is merit, & to abuse them is demerit. They prove what we are, & by their habits we take our character for ye following stages of our life.

ye different passions, senses, & Powers which unfold themselves in ye succesive stages, are necessary to yt progressive state. As ye views enlarge new habits & passions are requird, & thus ye mind opens & ~~improve~~ arrives at Perfection.

We may perceive ye great lines of our duty by ye harmony both of our inward & outward structure, & shall perhaps find ~~more~~ a more surprizing Divine Wisdom & goodness in ye human mind, than in ye rest of nature. ~~Wonderful in ye human~~ ~~of these, his Reason, faculties~~

From what has been said it appears yt man is made for a temperate, benevolent, active & Progressive State; yt he is greatly attracted to what is good, & repeld from ye contrary; yt he approves those actions yt respect ye good of others, & ~~dis~~approves ye reverse. Besides these he has particular perceptions, tho' not of ye same kind, yt have degrees of affection proportion to their tendencies to ye Publick good. We call a thing good when it answers ye End propos'd, & a creature so, when he acts agreable to his constitution. Therefore yt Man his Virtuous or good, who acts suitable to ye principles ~~& dignity~~ & destination of his Nature. His Dignity & Perfection will also be found here.

We thought it best to end with this class of Dahlias, as
sublimer ~~[illegible]~~ than any other, thinking yt in ye ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] of nature
our ideas daily improve, & consequently what is yt most excellent
& beautiful, must be ~~[illegible]~~ of yt latest date ~~[illegible]~~ good.

[illegible] of Duty or Virtue

[illegible] examined ye constitution & connections of Man, [illegible]em built a sys[illegible]tem of Moral Obligation, agreable to Reason, conscience, condition, & ye experience of Mankind; & [illegible] also [illegible] well his [illegible] passions to ye noble purposes they answer both in ye publick & mix[illegible] system.

From this it is plainly seen, there are three classes of Duties, ye 1st man owes to his Creator, ye second to himself, & ye third to society.

Part II.

ye Principal distinctions of Duty or Virtue

Having examin'd ye Constitution & connections of Man, & bui[illegible] System of Moral obligation on them, agreable to reason, his own conscience, & ye experience of Mankind; & having lo[illegible]d his Moral affections to ye purposes they answer both in ye private & publick System; we can plainly perceive, yt there are three Classes of Duties, ye 1st man owes to himself, ye 2d to Society, & ye 3d to his Creator.

As to ye 1st they are chiefly founded on yt defensive & private passions, yt make him pursue what is for his ~~private~~ Good, & avoid what ~~[illegible]~~ is detrimental to him. Prudence is ye preferring ye greatest Good, ~~what is ye best~~, & ye abviding ye greatest evil; ~~[illegible]~~ be discreet in ye ~~[illegible]~~ means to procure yt good & avoid ye evil; this in our Intellectuals corresponds with sagacity, or a quicke possesse in our outward Frame.

Part II.

1. ye principal distinctions of Duty or Virtue.

We have now examin'd Man's constitution & connections, & built a general system of Moral obligation on it, agreable to his reason, experience & condition, & have also trac'd ye final causes of his Moral faculties to ye part they take in ye Private & Public system. From these it is evident ye there are 3. classes of Duties, viz. he owes to himself, another to society, & a third to his Creator.

Those he owes to himself chiefly prompt him to pursue what is useful to him, & to chuse properly between various Goods, & also between various evils, & to avoid what is hurtful to him. This is what we call Prudence. This corresponds in our inward frame with Sagacity, & in our outward with quickness of sense. ye proportioning our defensive passions to our dangers is Fortitude, which by its nature supposes a due mixture of proper resentment, caution & ye rightly adjusting our private passions to our Wants is Temperance, which implies a just command of ye passions.

Those to society arise from ye social affections, ye true proportion of which to ye wants of others & to our several connections we call Justice. This contains ye whole of our Duty to Nature & Society; particularly ye Social Virtues viz. Gratitude Friendship Beneveolence &c. Prudence & Fortitude are also of this Class, & as they are differently situated may be call'd Private, Oeconomical or Civil. these shew us how to act in regard to ye lesser wants we are connected with.

As to those to our Creator they are also occasion'd by Public affections, & our glorious relations to him as our Creator Judge, & Benefactor &c.