Let your discourse in circles, at the meeting of friends, & at entertainments, be gentle & not at all obstinate. Nor should we exclude others as if were in possession of our own estate: but when in other things, as in common discourse, we then be vicissitudes not shamefull. Let us consider what the conversation turns upon. If upon serious, we should put on a serious countenance; if the conversation is jocose we should look merry. But as it is a right precept, that all too vident emotions of the mind not ~~governed by~~ obedient to reason we should avoid: so our discourse should also be free from such a kind of emotion; neither anger nor any thing like it should appear. For speach commonly

Latin translation

Book

shews the manners, & discovers the secrets of the mind. Nor did the Greeks say without reason that every man speaks as he lives. Care ought chiefly to be taken that we may seem to respect & love those with whom we converse.

Socrates being asked what was the chief virtue of young men: to avoid excess.

There is a certain kind of measure to be kept even in play, least we dissipate ourselves too much, & being elated by pleasure we fall into some shamefull act.

All our appetites ought to be kept within bounds & rendered sedate: our attention & diligence ought to be excited, that we do nothing either rashly or inconsiderately.

For we are ~~not so~~ do not seem to be formed by nature, ~~as to seem made~~ for nothing but joking & playing: but rather for serious things, & for grave & ~~greater~~ nobler studies.

We may indeed make use of play & jokes ~~but~~ upon the same foot as we use sleep & other refreshments when we have done our duties in grave & serious matters.

Socrates excellently said, that this is the nearest & the most compendious way to honor and glory if any one would endeavor to be what he ~~desires to be would do anything as if we~~ would be thought be. But if ~~the~~ any one by ~~would do same things it would much. But if~~ an empty ostentation & by a counterfeit ~~appearance~~ ~~[illegible] shadow would often~~ ~~look & gesture think to gain~~ ~~glory for themselves they greatly err~~ glory. They greatly err. For every thing that ~~[illegible] all [illegible] down in~~ put on a false appearance is as short lived ~~like [illegible] as the little flowers de~~

as flowers. Nor can dissimulation pass long

undiscovered.

Those who are to be at the head of the common wealth, let them remember this precept of Plato's, refer what ever they do, to the good of the whole not to their private ends.

to a guardianship, also the administration of publick affairs ought to be carried on with a view to the advantage of those who are committed to our care, not with a view to the advantage of those to whose care they are committed.

Indeed it seems to me, as if all every thing should be referr'd by those

who govern others, to this end, that those
they govern may be as happy as possible.

For it is not only the duty of him who governs citizens, but also of him who is master of slaves, or even of brute beasts, to promote the ease & happiness of all under their power or command. Therefore a wise & good citizen, & who himself is worthy of the highest dignity, will give himself wholly up to the publick & will take care of it in such a manner as to consult the good of all. He will not run after his riches & power, & will stick to close justice & honesty, as rather to die, than forsake them.

Novice is worse than avarice, especially in those who govern the publick. For to make a traffick of the publick, is not only shamefull, but also wicked & criminal. Nothing

can make those who govern, so agreable to the people as moderation & being free from all rapaciousness. Therefore it is the chief thing in the administration of publick affairs & in every publick office to drive away even the least suspicion of avarice.

Yet Cimon saw all the magistrates of his age, besides Aristides & Ephialtes, making a traffick of the republick at Athens, & that they had got great fortunes by these means; he took an other method, & kept himself free from every taint of avarice, he constantly refused all gifts that were offered him, & through his whole

life said & every thing without reward & innocently.

It is hard to express, how much politeness & affability gains the minds of men.

In performing the duty of a magistrate, humanity & greatness of mind ought to be exerted: least, if we are angry at those who come to us at improper times or who use too much Importunity ~~prefuse imprudently~~, we should fall into moroseness, & unreleasing odium. A little old woman ~~beseeching~~ beseeching Philip the King, that he would judge her cause, when he answered her that he had no time for such employment ~~that~~ she replied, therefore cease ~~no time~~ to be a King.

Philip wondering at the free speech of the woman, he not only gave her a hearing, but immediately tried a great many other causes, that came before him.

Gentleness & clemency ought to be so far approved, as is consistent with the use of severity when the publick good requires it, because without such severity the state cannot be well governed. For where all difference between the good & bad is taken away, confusion will follow, & every evil work will follow. It is not becoming to make use of an undistinguishing clemency extending to all alike: & to forgive all is as much cruelty as to forgive none.

Whosoever spares the bad hurts the good. He invites crimes, who pardons them by.

We ought to observe a mean. But because this is difficult whatever degree of punishment would exceed the crime should preponderate in favor of the criminal.

that where ever you come the is
the greatest private as well as publick
joy, because the city where you
enter ~~fon~~ receives a gardian not a tyrant, the
house where you are received a guest [illegible]

I always hear of you, that the safety, the
[illegible] that [illegible]
children, the reputation, & the fortunes
[illegible]
of those over whom you preside are most
dear to you, [illegible] that for these
[illegible] two years
you have constantly resisted money, [illegible]
[illegible] reasonable [illegible]
pleasure, & all unreasonable desires, [illegible]
[illegible]
in that [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] that you [illegible]
& that even in Asia, a province so apt to corrupt
no consideration pay'd, or made you depart from
[illegible]
your integrity & moderation; that those whom
[illegible]
power are not frightened when they hear
[illegible]
your are coming towards them, or apprehensive
[illegible]
of being put to too great a expence in entertaining
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] that
[illegible] before you
[illegible]
that
Tax easy of access: Your ears are open to the

complaints of all: that no mans poverty or want of friends excludes him from your house even chamber, much less from your seat of justice. Lastly that throughout your whole government nothing has been severe or cruel, that every thing is conducted with clemency, gentleness and humanity.

Because good or evil arrives to the publick from right or wrong judgement, for this reason the Ephori took particular care of that affair. They chose thirty men of the best repute out of themselves, which assembly seemed to be inferior to the Areopagus or the Lacedaemonian Senate. They chose one from men of themselves, who was the most remarkable for his justice to be their President. An allowance was given to them by the King for all their necessary uses.

were so affected, that they could no
longer regard truth only.

When they came together to give judgement, the President placed a golden chain about his own neck, made of the most precious stones from which hung an image representing Truth; eight columns were placed in the bridle in which were written the Egyptian laws. The [illegible] & the person accused pleaded their cause not by word of mouth but in writing. [illegible] & upon [illegible] matter was thoroughly cleared up to the judges, sentence was given & the President turned the image, Justice to the party in whose favor it was determined. In this manner did the Egyptians carry on there judicial proceedings. They thought that much obscurity frequently arose from the pleadings of the Lawyers & that it often happened through their arts the tricks of their action & the tears of the party in danger that they cast the eyes & the minds of the judges



But of all societies none is more excellent & more firm, than when we are joyned with good men like in morals: for that honesty, which we have often spoken of even when we see it in others, always moves us to be friends with those in whom we think we see it. And although all virtue attracts us to it, & obligeous acts were so those in whom it resides; yet justice & liberality chiefly affects us: but nothing is more lovely nor more binding, than the similitude of morals between good men: for in men among whom the same studies & the same inclinations, it always happens that each is as much delighted with the other as with himself & that is brought to pass which Pythagoras thought

to be the chief end of friendship, that all should act as one. Also there is another great connection between men, which arises from giving & receiving benefits; which while they are carried on with mutual love & gratitude unite men together in the strictest bonds of Society. But when we take a view of all these relations, we shall find no society stronger nor more dear to us, than that which subsists between the republick & every one of us: our parents are dear to us, our children are dear to us, our relations & friends; but our country is more dear to us than all these put together; for which what good man would make a doubt of giving up his life, if it could be of any real use to

What is more detestable than the brutality of those, who have deserted & wounded their country with all kinds of wickedness, & are have been employed in utterly destroying it.

But if any contention or comparison should arrise

to whom we are in the first place indebted, the answer is to our country & to our parents from whom we have received the greatest obligations: next one's children, & all one's family, who depend wholly upon us, and have no other refuge: afterwards all our relations generally are pretty near as we do. Wherefore the necessary support of life due to those upon first are chiefly mentioned: but to all the common

intercourses of life, such as council, conversation,
exhortation, consolation,
& sometimes also reproof, when that is necessary, thrive best among
friends: and that is the most agreeable
friendship, which seems to be by a similitude of
nature. For we are formed by nature, also
seem to be made for sport & joking, but also
for things of a serious nature, and for more
employments. However it is lawfull to use joking, but
as sleep & other refreshments, when we have
first performed our grave & serious affairs. But
then our joking ought to be neither profane
nor immodest, but ingenious & facetious:
for as we do not give liberty to stoyes

to do every thing they would do, but only those things which are not contrary to honest & virtuous actions; so even in joking good principles should shine out. There are are two kinds of joking: the one, illiberal, petulant, flagitious, & obscene: the other ellegant, polite, ingenious, and pleasant.

For he does ~~[illegible]~~ most as it becomes him, who acts the part which is most natural to him. Let every one therefore endeavour to know ~~therefore [illegible]~~ his own talents, & ~~become~~ a strict & impartial ~~[illegible] himself [illegible]~~ judge ~~of what~~ both of what is good & bad in himself; ~~thing he does both the good & bad; we should not have~~ least actors should seem to have more prudence than we have: for they do not choose the top parts for themselves, but those which they think they are most

qualified ~~adapted~~ for; those who have strong voices choose to appear in the plays ~~[illegible]~~ of Epigoni & Medus; those who have fine gesture, ~~those~~ choose to act the parts of Menalippa & of Clytemnestra; ~~[illegible]~~ but this whom I remember always acted the part ~~[illegible]~~ of Antiopa; ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ seldom that ~~[illegible]~~ of Ajax. Therefore what an actor does upon the stage, shall not a wise man see in life? ~~reality~~.

And because duties are not the same where there is a disproportion of years, there ~~are~~ being some for old & some for young men; therefore I will say something of this distinction. It is the part of a young man to have a reverence for those who are older than himself, & to choose of these the best & most approved of, whose counsels & authority they may lean upon:

for the inexperience of those who are but just entering into the youth ought to be ~~placed~~ directed and governed by the prudence of people who are in years. For that age is chiefly to be kept from any ungoverned passion, & to be exercised in labor, & patience both of body & mind; that they may improve & gain strength both for home & abroad ~~affairs~~. And also when they relaxe their minds, & give themselves up to pleasure, they should be void of intemperance, & remember modesty: which will be more easy if ~~older persons~~ would be present. But old men ought to keep their labors of the body, & increase those of the mind: ~~but~~ They should employ themselves in doing what is in their power to give advice both to their friends & to young men, but most of all to the republick. But nothing is to be more avoided by old men, than

least they should give way to languor & laziness.

But luxury which is shamefull at all ages, but if they have a kind of any taste for any luxurious in an old man is beastly: it brings a reproach upon old age its self & makes the intemperance of youth more imprudent & makes you hateful.

Therefore such order & decorum is to be observed in our actions, that as in a set speech, so also in life all things ought to be properly adapted. For it is shameful & very wrong, to act sportly & wittily when one is talking upon grave matters but very proper at a banquet. It was well said by Pericles, when he had Sophocles the poet for his colleague, when he was Prator & they were met upon publick business, & by chance a pretty boy passed by, Sophocles said, O Pericles what a fine boy that is! O Sophocles it does not become a Prator only to have his hands undefiled but also

his eyes. But if ~~this this same~~ Sophocles had said
The same
~~to~~ when he was shooing Wrestlers, he would
have deserved praise.

But those arts in which there is more skill & understanding
~~which there is no small~~ utility, as that of a Physician
~~or architect, as also of those who study that~~
or an architect, or any other creditable employment
all these become those to whose rank & station or
~~they are united~~ merchandize indeed if it is but for small things
is thought sordid: but if great & copious
importing many things from diverse nations
and selling it without fraud or extortion, is not much
~~to be above the public~~ to be discommended. Merchants
~~who are public~~ Also, if when satisfied with the
gain they have acquired, or rather contented
as they have often from sea arrive ~~safe in Port~~
~~So at last~~ God leaves the port of life & retire
~~to their fields~~ & to their fields & Husbandmen seem to me
to have the purest title to praise.

But wisdom (as it was defined by the Old Philosophers) is the knowledge of divine & human things, & the causes from which they proceed: the study of which whoever pleases, & can understand what there is in it, they will find it worth the pains of the mind & the delight of it & a respite from other cares & to be sought after; what can be compared to the studies of those, who are always enquiring after something that has a tendency to make them good & happy.

But wisdom (as it was defined by the old Philosophers) is the knowledge of divine & human things & the causes from which they proceed ~~[illegible]~~ the study of which ~~things~~; who ever blames, I do not understand what there is which they would praise ~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible] with [illegible]~~

~~[illegible] compar[illegible]~~

~~[illegible] been enquiring after curious things which~~

~~[illegible] to be a happy life~~

For what doe we think of Dionysius & how full was he always of fear & anguish! for he feared to shave himself with razors & therefore singed off his beard with with a red hot coale: What do we think of Alexander Pheraeus & who also always lived in anxiety; who (as we have read) although he loved his wife & lie very much; yet when he used to go from a banquet to her bedchamber, he commanded a slave who was branded with the Thracian mark to go with a drawn sword before him: & used to send some of his attendants, to examine the women cloaths prefer, least a dart might be hid in their cloaths.

Nor is any Empire so strong as to be able to stand against the fear of the people. Of this Phalaris is a proof, whose cruelty was greater, & more talked of, than any body's; who did not perish by snares, as Alexander of whom we have before spoken; who was not killed by a few, as our Cæsar; but was fallen upon by the whole nation of the Agrigentines. What! did not all the Macedonians leave Demetrius & join with Pyrrhus? What! did not all the allies of the Lacedemonians on a sudden desert them because they governed unjustly & were they not unconcerned spectators at the battle at Leuctra?

Therefore this is the third of those three things which belong to glory, that we should be judged worthy of the admiration & honor of men. Therefore they admire all things which surpass in general & with regard to particular, where their opinion, ~~but rather by if~~ they perceive any good qualities which they did not look for: & cry up to the skies. Therefore they chiefly admire those men, in whom they think they perceive some excellent & singular virtues: But they contemn & despise those, in whom they think there is no virtue, no courage, ~~no~~ nor any strength or resolution ~~and the like in prowess~~

2. F. E.



not only to read but also

For altho our books have excited many to write; yet I sometimes fear lest the name of Philosophy should be hated by some good men, they should wonder why I bestow so much time & labor upon it. But I, as long as the republick was taken care of by those, to whom she had committed herself, gave up all my thoughts & care to her: but when all was under the power of one single man, & there was no room either for Albion or authority to interpose, and I had lost those great men, who were my companions in defending the republick, I would neither give myself up to sorrow, which would have over powered me if I had not resisted it, nor to pleasure which would have been unworthy of a learned man.

And I wish the republick stood in the same ~~way~~ condition as it did in its first beginning; ~~and~~ that ~~it~~ it had not fallen into the hands of men so desirous of ~~changing, as I did~~ reforming it as I over turning it: ~~[illegible]~~ for in the first place, as we ~~were~~ accustomed to do while the republick stood, we would have ~~placed~~ our labor more in acting than in writing; afterwards we should not have committed those things to writing which we have ~~done~~ not committed; but the part ~~to~~ we ourselves bore in the administration as we have done before in many instances. But when the republick (in which I used to place all my thoughts & care) was totally destroyed, & I had no more business either in Senate or in the Forum

without doing something

and as my mind ~~could not be~~ could not be quiet, at this time of my life I was driven into this study ~~the~~ want of employment, I thought it the most honest idleness to turn to Philosophy to which when I was a young man, I allotted a great deal of my time ~~to study~~. After I had begun to honour conferred upon me I gave myself totally up to the republick, & there was so much time left for Philosophy, as ~~there~~ was ~~time~~ left over and above what was spent for the republick & for my friends: but I spent all this time in reading for I had not time to write.

Mrs George Baird

Sir

Yet in the midst of those great evils which we have mentioned, we have reaped this advantage that we have committed those things to writing, which were not known to our country men, and are most worthy of being known. For, yet O gods, what is more to be wished than wisdom? what is more excellent? what is better for man? what more worthy of man? Therefore they whosoever and ever after this are called Philosophers, ~~[illegible]~~ nor is Philosophy any thing else ~~[illegible]~~ if you would translate it literally but the study of wisdom. And wisdom (as it is defin'd by the old Philosophers) is the knowledge of divine & human things & their causes ~~[illegible]~~ from whence they spring: ~~[illegible]~~. The study of which whoever blames I cannot think what he will praise. For whether the delight of the mind or a respite from care is sought for

what can be compared to the studies of those, who are always enquiring after something which they are seeking out the way of being consistently virtuous this is either the way, or there is none by which this can be obtained: to say that there is no art in the greatest things, when even the least are not to be acquired without it, the man who says this is little considerate, & errs in the most important points; but if there is any discipline or training up to virtue, where shall it be sought for? when you shall depart from this method of learning it. But these things, when we exhort to the study of Philosophy we used to be discussed more accurately, as we have done in a former book.

But as we have been objected to by some Even by
~~But it appears to us, & indeed we were~~
wise and learned men, whether we are consistent
with ourselves, when we say that nothing is
clearly perceive, yet ~~that we~~ are accustomed to
treat of other things, & ~~that we lead~~ this present
time ~~follow~~ lay down the precepts of duty, I wish that
our opinion ~~[illegible]~~ was well understood:
for we are not like those
whose minds wander in error & have no fixed rule
to follow: for ~~[illegible]~~ in what kind of way is that mind, or rather what
kind of life ~~[illegible]~~ does he lead, who has no one principle
~~[illegible]~~ of disputing ~~[illegible]~~ or even living?
But we ~~[illegible]~~ as others call some things certain
~~[illegible]~~ others uncertain; so, differing
from them, we maintain that some things
are probable, others improbable.
Therefore what is there that should hinder
me, from following those things which seem probable

† which come under
deliberation

* were the chief Philosophers.

to me; & shun those things which I disprove,
by means & avoiding the arrogance of affirming,

which is widely different from wisdom.
it is our practice to dispute against every
But ~~on the other hand at those we dispute~~
things because this probable which we
follow cannot be clearly made out unless
~~by an which can~~ a dispute was carried on about those points
as I think dilligently
But these things are enough explained in
which come
our academics. But you my dear
Cicero, altho you are conversant in the most
ancient & noble philosophy
most like
Your
Crassipes being teacher
those great men who acquainted with our
yet I would have you
Philosophy which is near a kin to yours.
But we will now go on with our
design.

Besides you have taken the upon yourself a heavy burden of being educated under the care of Cratippus; to whom when you go as to a place of traffick for learning, it would be shamefull to return without being improved, both unbecoming the authority of the place & master. Wherefore you ought as much as is in your power with all possible labor to apply yourself to make proper improvements; nor let it ever be said rather than pleasure that whenever thing has been so plentifully supplyd by me, you should miscarry by being wanting to yourself.

We have a another substantial witness for our purpose, Posidonius, who writ in a certain epistle, that Publius Rutilius Rufus was accustom'd to say, who had heard Panætius, that no Painter ever was found, who could finish that part of the Venus at Coos, which Apelles had left unfinished, (for they had no hope of coming up to the beauty of the countenance in the rest of the body): so those things which Panætius had passe by, ~~[illegible]~~ ~~the beauty of the countenance finished, [illegible] kept up~~ on account of the excellency of those things which he had finish'd, no other person presume to attempt.

~~That~~ As if each member should take it in its head, that it could be strong & well, if it could draw to itself the nourishment of the next member, it would necessarily weaken & destroy the whole body; so, if every one of us should endeavour to get the goods of others for ourselves & detract for our own use, whatever might be of advantage to other, the Society & community of men would necessarily be overturn'd. For ~~it~~ that every one ~~can~~ may rather acquire for himself, what is necessary for the carrying on of life, than for another is allowed, & the law of nature says nothing against it: but nature does by no means allow us to increase our means, wealth & influence by the spoils of others. Nor is this only agreeable to the law of nature, which is the law of Nations

but also the particular laws of people are settled in the
same way & lay down this principle
that it is not lawfull to hurt another for
one's own convenience: for the laws have this in view,
& chiefly intend this one thing that
~~they will have that the commonwealth~~
society may
of citizens be safe, those who destroy it they
punish with death, exile, prison, & fines. And
the nature & reason of things ~~nature does~~, which
binds this still more strongly
is the Divine & human law, ~~to whom whoever~~
upon as
which law whoever
would obey (but all will obey it, who intend to
will never suffer
live agreably to nature), ~~he shall not~~
himself to covet what belongs to another
~~as with adversaries & to take from another~~
or to apply to his own use what he takes
~~from himself~~
from another.

But duty is chiefly overturnd in friendships; & not to afford what is right, & to afford what is not just, is contrary to one's duty. But these kinds of precepts are all short & easy. Those things which seem usefull, as honour, riches, pleasures, & other things of this kind are never to be prefered to friendship but a good man should do nothing either against the republick or contrary to an oath & fidelity, for the sake of a friend: not even the appointed judge, ought he to be partial to his friend; for he ought to lay down the person of a friend when he takes that up of a judge.

Men overturn all things, when they disjoin utility from honesty, which is the foundation ~~of nature~~. For all of us ~~desire~~ seek for utility, & we are snatched by it, nor can we ~~do any thing~~ act otherwise: for who is the man, who avoids utility? or rather who is he, who does not most carefully follow it? but because the true & real utility is not to be found unless in praise, in ~~what is becoming~~ honor in honesty, ~~in utility~~; and we do not think the name of utility so splendid, as necessary.

Themistocles after the victory he gain'd
in the war against the Persians, said in
the assembly, that he had got a ~~scheme~~ scheme which
he thought would be very salutary for
~~for the state~~
the republick, but it was not necessary
it should be known by all: & desired
that the people would name somebody
to whom he should comunicate it:
they named Aristides: to whom Themis-
tocles said, that the Lacedamonian fleet,
which was return'd to its habour at ~~Gy~~
Gytheum, could be privily burnt; which
being done the Lacedamonian ~~fleet~~ strength
must necessarily be destroy'd. Which
when Aristides had heard, he went
back to the assembly, to the great

expectation of all; & said that the ~~advice~~ advise which Themistocles gave, was usefull but not honest. Therefore the Athenians thought that nothing could be usefull that was not honest; & they rejected it.

But it often happens (as I have said before) that utility seems to be repugnant to honesty, as it is to be observed, & very clearly, whether it can be joyned with honesty. These are the questions of this Kind: If (for the sake of an example) a good man had brought a great quantity of Corn from Alexandria to Rhodes, & that there was at that time a great want & famine there, & the greatest

dearnes of corn: if the same man knew, that a great many merchants were comming thither from Alexandria with corn; should he tell this to the Rhodians or should he be silent & sell his corn for as much as he can?

We are now representing a wise & good man: and we are enquiring in what manner he would ~~we will look about this diliberation~~ deliberate. ~~consultation~~, who would not ~~tell the~~ conceal anything from the Rhodians if he thought it shamefull; but he ~~will~~ may be doubt whether it be shamefull or not.

For these are the properties of
this virtue, to fear nothing, to despise
all human things, to think nothing
intolerable which happens to man.
Therefore what did he do? he came
into the Senate, he told them
his message; he refuse to give his
advise as a Senator, for as long
as he was held by his oath to the
Enemy, he said, he was not a
Senator. And he said that he
~~thought it would be unprofitable~~ thought it would be unprofitable to restore
captives; for that they were
men of good Generals. That he

was now worn out with years, when
he had prevailed by his authority, the
Captives were retain'd & he went
himself went back to Carthage,
neither the love of his
Country nor that of his relations
could detain him.

+ good, pain the chief evil.

in the first what room
for ~~place will be left~~ for prudence
must it only hunt after delights to
gratify pleasure? how miserable ~~slave~~
a servitude is this for virtue, only to cater
~~virtue will be to pleasure forced~~
for pleasure! but what is the
office ~~of~~ prudence? will it be only
to pick & to choose ~~the~~ pleasures? ~~nothing~~ ~~pretty~~
suppose no employment
~~or~~ more agreable; yet what can be thought
more shameful? Now he who says that
pain is the greatest evil, what room
has he left for fortitude, which consists in
despising ~~of~~ pain & labor? for altho'
Epicurus says many things in this place
elsewhere as well
(~~as he says here~~) courageously enough
~~[illegible]~~
pain: yet it is not so much to be considered
what he says, as what is agreable to his
system, who makes pleasure the chief

~~yet if they~~

But if they are to be blam'd, who are silent; what are those to be thought of, who joyn falsehood to what they say? Caius Canius a Roman Knight who was a pleasant man & learn'd enough, when he came to Syracuse for the sake of being at leisure, (as he was accustom'd to say) not for the sake of business, used often to say, that he should be very glad to buy some small place, where he might invite his friends to, & at which he might amuse himself

called

without being disturb'd. Which when it was
commonly talk'd by every body, a certain
Pythius, who was a money scrivener at Syracuse,
said to him, that he had no such a place to
sell, but that he desired him to make
use of it as if it was his own; & at the
same time invited him to come & sup
with him the next day. Which when
he had promis'd he would, then Pythius,
who, as he dealt in money, was most
agreable to all orders of men, called for
some fishermen to come to him, & desired
them that they would fish the next before
his garden, & told them what he would
have them do. Canius came at the time

appointed a Supper: a very elegant entert-
ment was prepared by Pythius: he pere
before his eyes a great number of fishing
boats: every one of the fishermen brought
what fish they had caught & laid them
at Pythius's feet. Then Carinus said;
Pray Pythius what is this? such quantity
of fish & such a number of boats? Pythius
answer'd, what is the great wonder?
all the fish that are eaten at Syracuse
come from this place: the fish could not
live if it wan't for this water. Carinus
being fired with a desire of buying it begg'd
very much of Pythius that he would sell
him. He would not at first agree

to it. But why should I not cut the Ship
he obtain'd it; this ~~demone~~ greedy & rich man
gave as much for it as Sydius ask'd;
& bought all that belong'd to it: ~~he~~ separately
~~agreed to it~~ was given for the purchase, & they struck up a bargain.
Canius invited some of his friends to come
& see him there: he himself came
there early: he saw no fishing boats there:
he enquired of one of the neighbours,
whether it was not a Holy day among
the Fishermen, for he saw none of them
there. None that I know of, answere
the man: ~~but they are not~~ accustom'd
to fish here; therefore, I wonder'd
day, at what happen'd. Canius

begun to stomach it. But what could I
do? for Aquillius, my friend & college
had not then made ~~the~~ his laws about fr
when I ask'd him what was that dolus malus
bad
deceit, he answered when one pretends
one thing & acts another.

Wherefore both Sythius & all those
who pretend one thing & ~~say another~~ do another,
are perfidious, wicked, & malitious.
Therefore nothing can be usefull,
when tinctur'd with indefinite to many vices.

S. L. Lyon,

therefore we esteem them the first and chief