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The late Lord Ponsonby to the
late Lord Beaumont 1834 (then Am-
bassadors at Constantinople & Vienna. - 54.

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Private

July 15th 1834

My Dear Lord

I received your letter of the 27th inst by the Post
of yesterday. & am happy to learn that we are
likely to have some Intelligence from England.

My Despatches &c. will make you acquainted
with my ideas respecting this country & you
will perceive the extreme augmentation of my
palace of Russia. I certainly continue full
as anxious as ever to see that the affairs of this
region should be settled by us in conjunction with
Russia & I fully retain my opinion that the
true policy of Austria is to cling to her old
& natural friend England & oppose the aggressions

degeneration of Naples, & I am convinced that Austria
will be ultimately the victim of Neapolitan ambition
if Naples be allowed to become the possessor of
this military position & mine of political
power. I am also aware that Metternich
eagerly proposes to be decidedly adverse to
the increase of Neapolitan power: but neither
my own conviction of the soundness of the
policy I have mentioned nor the declaration
of Prince Metternich prevents my suspicions,
more than suspicious, strong belief, that
Metternich does not now take this view
of the interests of Austria, or of his own power,
and that his declarations are not entitled

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continued, produce the total destruction of it
I believe Metternich deserves this result -
We shall also see what part he will take
when the fact comes to be known how the
Prussians have now extorted from Admiral
Pasha at St Petersburg purchase of Turkish Territory
on the Asiatic frontier (but I beg you will not
mention this fact at present) under the penalty
of the refusal of the Emperor to complete the
promises he has made of reduction of his
pecuniary claims on a sheet now in part
the price of the Treaty of 8th July -
I believe Metternich regards France as the only
object of present & perhaps of future fear. He sees
there the enemy who can & will attack him
morally & physically. - the soul of this spirit of
enquiry & change by which his political domestic

power is menaced & may be overthrown and also
the enemy who can wrest from him Italy &
lower his authority in Germany & be perceived
that by putting Russia in possession of Constan-
tinople he brings that Power into a situation
where it will be able to act directly upon
France, which at present it cannot do, & where
at all events it must ever be the most
powerful diversion in favor of the enemies
of France probably rendering it impossible
for France to risk any war in Germany
or Italy. Great Britain may feel that
the two countries France & Russia thus
placed Austria will always be able to
hold the balance between them - To all which
it may be added that Austria would obtain

immense territorial advantages as they shall
 & reward. if the operation were completed -
 What has been here said of Austria is ap-
 plicable in a considerable degree to Prussia
 that Power fears the action of France upon
 her Provinces upon the Rhine and also
 the influence of french principles on
 her form of Government. & as Austria
 may be bribed by territories not to fear
 the power of Russia in the East so Prussia
 may imagine that a large field opened in
 that region for the gratification & enter-
 prize of Russian Ambition. Prussia will
 have no additional cause to fear her.

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The foregoing shews what I suspect & what I am
tempted strongly, to believe - but I am of opinion
that the suspicion alone is proved enough for
our absolutely refusing to take anything like a
pledge or engagement from Austria as a solid
security for the arrangements that are necessary
to the future independence of England & France
of the caprice or despotism or anger of Russia.
As to believing that Russia is sincere or will
be sincere in the promises she makes or may
make respecting Turkey I shall believe that,
^{when I believe that}
man has ceased to love power & riches & fame
& freedom from control. Russia is actually
nothing as she is compared with what she will
immediately be whenever she obtain possession
of this country. I sent home a Paper some months

also to prove from Russian documents that Napoleon
never could be content with any security for the
freedom of the press of the Bourbons & Russians
other than the security of actual popes - Piquet
speech has shown the whole world what value
Napier places upon the key of the our House
any man who can presume to give an opi-
nion on political subjects must have capa-
city enough to understand ~~the~~ & perceive
the nature & magnitude of your Russian
wrong stain by the popes of this country
such I would ask any man who values the
liberty, the honor, the prosperity of England,
he could reconcile it to his feelings of duty
to place such interests as a stake upon such
good faith, to be won or lost by the truth
of Metternich! or whether the dictates of

of the commonest good sense, of the most every day
understanding do not command him to
take a different security for their safety.

I have no doubt Pitternich will employ
all his art to make a Treaty so contrived that
everything shall be engaged for, & every sort of
guarantee given by Austria, that France
or England shall demand. So long as it
shall be left to Austria to be the Power
who can enforce or neglect, the binding
principle of such Treaty -

I think that Power who shall neglect the ex-
isting opportunity to secure England, & shall
add France, from the necessity of having their
resources to arms to check the advance of
Napoleon upon this Country, will deserve the name,

cession, & I doubt not will suffer it. If this question
be not now securely settled what is the necessary
consequence of half measures? Russia will
yield & will promise anything. We shall dis-
cern. An occasion will come or can be
made that shall be made appear to call
imperatively on Russia to take possession of
this country. We shall be too late to pre-
vent that deed - we may not find an ally dur-
ably or in a state to aid us in an
attempt to remedy the evil of it. Russia
once quietly or securely in possession of this
country for six months will be able to
acquire tenfold power for retaining it
Greece will be less - that country is already

prepared by suppose intriguers for that gate &
 we shall find how different it is to act at
 the right moment or at the wrong - At present
 circumstances will force Maria to yield - her
 yielding will itself ^{be} productive of infinite loss of
 strength to her: much of her force & very much is
 the produce of her reputation for success - it
 springs from what is vulgarly called Puff. Maria
 says "look at me dan morneille" who shall
 dare to combat with me? - The world believes
 Maria rules those who are twice as strong
 twice as valiant twice as wise as herself
 but who want her impudence & her audacity
 in boasting. Maria means are small compared
 with those that ought to be opposed to her & even
 by her proximity or situation to this country gives
 me no alarm for the result if we are not too
 timid to face the bully - I am confident of me

thing that if this question is settled as it will be called,
by a Treaty now. The seeds of a disunion have not
be sown in the most fertile of soils - they will come
rapidly to maturity & those who may now be vectors
perhaps, I will say probably if not certainly without
a contest will then be vanquished or Europe will
be convulsed by contending principles the success
of any one of which will be accompanied by the
growth of evils - I see no cause to believe
our vigorous support of our own rights & of the
solid independence of Turkey essential to the pre-
servation of those rights, would lead at present
to a general war. Suppose Russia resorts to
war we can combat Russia without interfering with any
other nation & the quarrel will be decided
at a distance from everybody. If Austria
then remains neutral, there can be nothing
to enthrall other powers beyond the first Disputations.

If we be victorious it is clearly our interest, not to interfere with any of the securities of Russia but rather to encrease them if we can, & bind her by advantages to the cause of the independence of Turkey, not to excite her to desire a change there - we also shall have motives of interest to keep peace everywhere, & that ought to be the first of Austria's objects.

For should we worsted & Russia victorious the neutrality of Russia may not be the source of any ill to her, for assuredly Russia will not have defeated France & suffered without having suffered herself in the contest with them, to be reduced to a state that will make peace a friendship with Austria necessary to her -

If in deprecation of these evident (as I think)

reasons for her neutrality but she should pro-
-fer embarking with Russia in efforts, or a war
to uphold the existence of the system on which
Russia has det^{on}ed ~~to~~ which it is evident she intends
to act. Russia must, risk everything - and on
my soul I believe, will lose much of her power.

With these opinions ~~present~~ influencing me,
my manner of viewing the question of a
Treaty will not surprise you, & you will
not see in it, I presume, any departure
from the idea & the wish I have always
entertained that we should settle these affairs
in conjunction with Russia; I desire to do
so, & I think it ought to be an easy thing to do,
but I think it cannot be done by what is
ordinarily understood to be a settlement,

by Treaty, without our disgraceful withdrawal in the
 eyes of the world & becoming the dupe of Napoleon
 & Austria. What I should desire to see is a treaty
 accompanied by such physical & other guards as will
 ensure its execution, whilst other measures are
 pursuing to completion, it is incumbent to make
 the Turk able to protect himself hereafter against
 the attack of Napoleon - This I know a difficult thing
 to reanimate an corpse & a phyci. but as life is
 not at all near being extinct, but on the contrary
 as there is immense strength in the frame & sub-
 stance of this country, I imagine th. they may
 be done - If it cannot, it will be time enough,
 when the experiment has faild, to sacrifice
 the measureable carcass to the common safety &
 health of Europe, and then, what is necessary
 may be done, which will be impossible if
 Napoleon shall be allowed to go on in her schemes

and her destroying acts without check now -
I presume you cannot be aware of the absolute
control exercised by the Russian Minister over the
Poste at this moment! I have evidence - proofs -
of it in my hands, and the authority exercised by
The Russian Ambassadors in Poland just before the
friendship of Catherine made it her wish, was not
more despotic than that now held by the Charge d'Affaires
Baron Proskow, though it is now the policy of
Napier to conceal it, and the policy of Russian
to deny it, whilst Baron Stierne knows it
as well as I do -
As to Turkey, every man in it is against Napier
with a man however will fight at present, nor
unless we are ready to fight by the side of them
may engage with us in the cause. The Turks have
been so often deceived by all European Courts
that they never learn prudence, they know that

simple handed they are not a match for Russia
at present, & they will not risk the contest,
but they have deadly hatred for the Russians,
& the strongest belief in our power & will to
rescue Turkey, & to give it time to breathe &
live again. I believe the Magyar population
to be entirely & strongly adverse to the cause of
Russia: there is a new life & spirit in that
Magyar sees before him, & at no great dis-
tance, an entire equality of rights for
himself compared with the Turk. He knows it
must come if the country is preserved in-
dependent - he may even hope for more -
but he knows that if Russia becomes the
ruler of this country, the Magyar who now

aspire to more than liberty, must then
become a Paper Leaf & forever —

To save this / the least of the Empire / from
the Paper Attacks & make it secure for
every coup de main ^{plus etc.} & in a position to be
able to wait for success for allies, is a
very easy matter — Silistria must be re-
stored to the right owner — the town of Sigopolis
in the Bay of Bouda in the Black Sea, guarded
so as to prevent the disembarking of artillery
& the casting a battery of the Protopharon
could be managed & then the whole fleet of
Paper may be seized & all this will cost
little or nothing if ^{by} the firm will to leave

It done & perverted in. It is therefore an
 idle excuse, in my mind, to set up the difficulty
 of stopping Napoleon as the cause of its not being
 attempted, and I have no doubt, that the true
 state of this part of the question will be made
 clearly known to the French & English, & to the
 world, so that those who shall flinch from the
 work will be exposed without cloak to the
 keen examination of all -

Selestria affords me the means of giving you
 a short & bright illustration of the actual
 intentions of Napoleon at the moment of
 hastening to accomplish ^{under} unbounded
 goodwill for Turkey & the most solemn
 promises, to leave her independence un-
 touched - Selestria, you know, is mortgaged to

Russia for a sum of money. It has been talked of
in contemplation, and is known to have been
most earnestly desired by the Sultan, to redeem
that Mortgage & gain possession of that Key of
Sussex Turkey. The Russians have arranged
with Ahmed Pasha that this Mortgage shall
be paid by instalments & cleared off at
the expiration of eight years. Thus taking
care by Treaty to hold in their hands the
Key of the Empire during eight years to come
Katherine & Medar must think us Poltroons
& Lyes. Beasts of another stock and those to
treat us so! - We shall be guilty the Russian
stock of the world if we give credit to pro-
posals made by Katherine & Medar with
such facts staring us in the face.